to the relations between these movements and the ex-colonial powers, Britain and France. Bnt it has only been with the appearance on the international scene of some 17 independent West African states, enjoying, in varying degrees, control of their own external policies, that the importance of inter-African state relations is beginning to be recognized, outside West Africa, at any rate; a number of West African political leaders have been interested in these matters for some time. Hence this is not a subject about which there is as yet a great deal of material.
Secondly, one characteristic of the existing West African state system, clearly, is its extreme fluidity . For some time it has been evident that a process of decolonization was taking place throughout the African continent and with particnlar rapidity in West Africa, where European resistances have been less powerful than in other regions, and African national movements relatively mature and well organized. But it has not been at all clear what would be the character of the successor states that would replace the dissolving colonial systems. One could not have predicted with any assurance, say five years ago, that an independent Nigerian federal state wonld take the place of the former colonial Nigerian state, or that the former French West African Federation would break up into eight separate, formally sovereign, repnblics. One certainly could not have predicted the Ghana-Guinea Union, nor the creation and subsequent disintegration of the Mali Federation (both reflections of the will to regroupment across territorial frontiers) . One must, I think, expect this fluidity to continue and the system to undergo sudden, major, unpredictable (or, at least, unexpected) changes.
Thirdly, one carmot hope to understand the West African state system in isolation from other African systems and, of course, from other nonAfrican systems, the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc. Let us confme ourselves, for the moment, simply to the African aspects of the situation. It is clear that the existing alignments of West African states-the relationships between them----are greatly influenced by developments in two African territories lying outside the West African system-Algeria and the Congo-and the differing attitudes of West African governments to these developments. Crudely stated, the Governments of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, take a "tough," anti-colonial line on these two major issues. Ivory Coast, Senegal. Cameroun. for the monlent, take a "lnoderate." somewhat uncommitted line. Nigeria lies somewhere between. Consider likewise the Mauretanian question under consideration recently at the UN. What this question is about is, partly, whether the existing Maure-tanian Government is a genuine government or a French puppet government; but it is partly also about the more fundamental question whether Mauretania-Shinqit-belongs to the West African or the North (Arab) African system. Thus, it can be seen that the West Mrican state system is extremely sensitive to developments in any part of the African continent, from Egypt to the Union of South Africa.
Fourthly, this West African region, with a total population of some 75 million, is characterized by a good deal of internal diversity, though not necessarily more diversity than characterizes the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. For example, there are the differences between the territories of the beidan (Arabs and Berbers-Tuareg) and of the sudan (NegroSudanic peoples); Muslim and non-Muslim (Animist-Christian) regions ; the economically more developed, export-producing, forest belt, and the more retarded, subsistence-farming, savanna hinterland; socially hierarchical, highly stratified communities as in Mauretania. the northern region of Nigeria. and relatively equalitarian communities as in Ghana. southern Nigeria. the Ivory Coast; partially English-speaking and partially Frcnch-speaking-and, to a minor extent, Portuguese----ru1d American-speaking territories.
It will be noted that the first four differcntia can and do occur within the same state. e.g. Nigeria; only the last is necessarily a basis of differentiation between states.
Against this background. let us look more closely at this West Mrican state system. It may be easiest to do this from some definite point of view. The most important single issue in contemporary West Africa, I would suggest-in regard to which evety West African government is bound to take up some kind of position and in which. in varying degrees, peoples and popular movements, as well as governments, are interested-is the issue of fragmentation versus closer West Mrican union. Should West Africa continue to be organized on the basis of a number (approximately 22. if ex-A.E.F. is included) of relatively small (Nigeria apart) political units-permitting. possibly. even greater fragmentation? Or should a serious attempt be made to combine these units into larger. more comprehensive, political systems. with the eventual aim of establishing a "United States of West Africa"?
With the issue of national independence, which dominated Mrican political thought and activity during the 1950·S. settled in principle (Portuguese Guinea remaining the one territory in the region in which the colonial Power continues to resist the general trend). this other issue of closer union is tending to become the dominant question of the 1960'S. It is the:subject of a great debate, in which all the West African states are involved. This is a debate, not only about aims-between what one might call the "Pan-Africanists" (for whom the Presidents of Ghana and Guinea, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and M. Sekou Toure, have become two of the principal spokesmen) and the "particularists" or "states' rights men" (e.g., the President of the Ivory Coast, M. Felix HouphouetBoigny); but also about methods-between the "functionalists," who want to work towards closer union by gradual practical measures of interstate co-operation (customs unions, abolition of passport controls, closer cultural ties, etc.), and the "federalists," who want to press forward to an actual pooling of sovereignty at the earliest possible date.
To speculate about the outcome of this great debate would be very rash. It would be more useful simply to consider the acIual situation, and to ask: What are the forces making for fragmentation on the one hand, and for closer union on the other? And what can be said about their relative strength?
On the one side of fragmentation or particularism there are, first of all, the various differences of which I have already spoken-geographical, ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological. This means that various types of frontier have to be taken into account. West Africans, in their eflort to achieve closer union, lack one great advantage which North Mricans, the peoples of the Maghrib, enjoy-a common language (Arabic). They are confronted with a situation in which no Mriean language, even the most widely diffused, embraces more than a few million people, and in which there are two distinct dominant languages, English and French. This fact, as Canadians know, is not an insuperable obstacle in the way of creating a common political system. But, for the moment at any rate, the existing frontiers between zones of French and of English language and culture severely limit the possibilities of communication between the African elites, though considerable efforts are being made in both zones to improve communications. Moreover, the partition of West Afriea into zones de l' expression fran(aise et anglaise has involved the development of institutions of different types-different educational, administrative, and judicial systems, for example-the channelling of trade towards different markets, and the creation of different networks of commercial relationships. These are obstacles, obviously, which any attempt to link Englishspeaking and French-speaking West Mrican territories together in a common system would have to overcome.
In this connection I should no doubt mention the force of "ttibalism," or it may seem that I am attempting to evade the issue. Actually tribalism, as the term is commonly used, seems to me a somewhat confused idea. "Ethnic loyalties" are certainly a fact in West Aftica as elsewhere in Africa and in Britain, and they tend, certainly, to stand in the way of the new loyalties and of the emerging state, or wider "pan-African" idea which governments, parties, and political leaders (for the most part) are trying to build up. But these ethnic loyalties tend, or have tended, in &ct, to be strongest among peoples like the Hausa-Fnlani in northern or the Y oruba in western Nigeria, the Ashanti in Ghana, the Moshi in Upper Volta, who had behind them, in the pre-colonial period, well-developed and powerful states, which were not in any intelligible sense "tribal." Moreover, even if "tribalism" is understood in this extended sense, in most of West Africa it is, I believe, a declining force. Given, as in Ghana, a conflict between a tribalistic movement and a centralizing government, based on a mass party, the balance of advantage lies clearly on the latter's side.
Very important, clearly, is the economic factor. Elliot Berg,' in a recent article on the relationship between economic facts and political attitudes in the states of French-speaking West Africa, brings out very well the connection between the political role of the Ivory Coast, and its dominant party, the P.D.C.I.-R .D.A. , as the principal defender of particularism and opponent of the preservation of the unity of "ex-A.O.F.," and its special economic position, as the wealthiest of the French West African territories, much the largest exporters, etc. Thus Ivory Coast "particularism" expressed the standpoint of the Ivory Coast cocoa and coffee farmers and "bourgeois" generally, who did not see why the wealth which they possessed should be used to support and subsidize the more backward economies of other French West African territories. Even in the case of the poorer territories of ex-A.O.F.-Upper Volta, Niger, Mauretania-there are certain obvious short-run arguments for the particularist attitudes of their governments: the guaranteed prices, subsidies, loans, investments, derived from France, which they would be likely to lose if they opted for association with some larger political system-Upper Volta with Ghana, Niger with Nigeria, Mauretania with Morocco.
In this connection I must add what seems to me the plain truththough I am doubtful whether representatives of metropolitan France would altogether agree with me-that French policy, particularly since 1956 and the promulgation of the Loi Cadre, has tended to promote this process of Balkanization and has worked towards the breaking up of the old French West Mrican Federation. During the critical period 1956-8, the French supported the particularists like M. Houphouet-Boigny against the federalists like Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita, when there was strong popular pressure within French West Africa to preserve the unity of the Federation. As a French writer put it at the time: "Le Ministere de la France d'Outre-Mer, sentant son existence menacee, a chercM des consolations dans la multiplication de ses enfants." I am not arguing that the French Government at this time foresaw the possible advantages of bringing 14 new French-speaking voices into the Assembly of the United Nations, of which II (or 12 with Mauretania) would be reasonably sympathetic to the French position. Indeed, until 1959, French governments of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics acted on the assumption that the French system, ftrst the "Union" and then the "Community," would continue to function as ' a centralized affair, with metropolitan France controlling external policy. But what I think is clear is that when in 1955-6, at the time of the introduction of the Loi Cadre the French Government recognized that the transfer of political power in Africa south of the Salrara was inevitable if there were not to be other Algerias, it decided to transfer power, by stages, to the individual territories, implying the dismantling of the Federation which France itself had constructed fifty years earlier.
Finally, of course, there are the interests of various kinds which tend to grow up around any government. There are ministerial offices, junior ministries, chefs de cabinet, permanent secretaries, embassies, delegations to the United Nations and to a variety of international bodies, eventually military posts. As President De Gaulle said, in one of his more inspired moments, "Le souverainete, c' est quelque chose"; it is indeed Hquelque chose." In crude terms, it increases the range of opportunities for an interesting and reasonably comfortable life for members of the ruling class. Thus every establishment, even a young one, is liable to develop an attitude of resistance to change, especially where change means the absorption of minor states into some larger system. It is understandable that there should be those who feel that it is better to reign in Wagadugu than serve in Dakar or Accra. Africans are no different in these matters from the rest of us.
All this might seem to suggest that I believe the forces making for fragmentation or Balkanization in West Africa are likely to be dominant; that the existing state system, and the existing frontiers, are likely to become frozen with minor modifications for some considerable time to come. Yet this is not what I in fact believe. Why not? What are the forces working in a contrary direction, tending to stimulate closer West African union? They can be fairly simply stated. First, communications. Talk about frontiers must not obscure the fact there is a vast and constant movement of Africans across state boundaries. As M. Paul-Marc Henry has put it: "The great masses of Africans prove themselves to be superbly unconcerned with the frontiers established by the European powers. They . . . are far more mobile than any other population in any other continent." West Africans have, throughout their history, been great traders and travellers. The colonial epoch has generated new incentives for movement-plantations, mines, citiesand has made available new techniques of transportation, above all, the lorry. Hence there is a great flow of people throughout the region, for example, from the Niger Bend and Upper Volta down to Ghana and the Ivory Coast, and the continual circulation of Hausa and Dioula traders. This movement of people assists the movement of ideas. The ideas of the c.P.P. were carried into Timbuktu. The influence of the P.D.G. seeped through into Sierra Leone. Sawaba in Niger and N.E.P.U. in the northern region of Nigeria echoed each other's slogans and ideologles.
These communications across existing frontiers are evident at the level of the elites as well as of the masses. They also are constandy on the move. One important consequence of decolonization has been the great expansion of inter-African contacts, not ouly among political leaders, but also among trade unionists, civil servants, teachers and students. This is reflected in the fact that people are usually not where you expect-or hope -them to be, but somewhere else.
Hence West African frontiers, I would be inclined to argue, lack solidity. As products of the period of colonial partition, they are somewhat disreputable from the standpoint of radical nationalists. In most cases they are ethnic and economic nonsense. While, as Jaja Wachuku has said, there would be opposition to any attempts to change them by force, in a number of cases-for example, Gambia-Senegal, Togo-Ghana, Niger-Nigeria-it is difficult to see how they can be maintained in their present form for long. "Revisionism," in fact, is a force in contemporary West Africa. • at their disposal, were able to construct. and maintain for a period. political systems covering large regions of West Africa (larger. in some cases. than any existing state). surely we. with the much more advanced techniques at our disposal. should be able to organize a more extensive and stable form of West African Union."
This argument is reinforced by another implied in the use of the term "Balkanization." West African political leaders have certainly paid attention to the experience of other regions of the world where the elimination of an established imperial power-Spanish or Ottomanwas followed by the emergence of a number of weak. competing states. exposed to the play of great power rivalries-not only the Balkans. but also Latin America. and. in more recent times. the Arab states. Hence the desire. or rather determination. to avoid a repetition of this experience in post-colonial Africa and the acceptance of the equations: fragmentation implies political (and economic) weakness; closer union is a pre-condition of effective independence. History does not have to repeat itself, since a new factor is always present. men's awareness of past history.
Thirdly. Pan-Africanism. In the last resort. I suppose. one's estimate of the prospects of closer West African union depends upon one's view of the effectiveness of the "Pan-African" idea or cluster of ideas. In essentials the Pan-African position might be summarized in some such way as this:
(a) African peoples. as a consequence of their experiences during the pre-colonial and colonial epochs. have certain common characteristics. (c) It is also necessary to prevent the intervention of non-African powers in the affairs of the "African family"; to settle inter-African disputes as far as possible "within the family."
(d) As a means partly to express their common outlook, partly to resist external "colonial or neo-colonial" pressures, partly to develop African resources for African advantage, there should be created, in the fIrst place, "regional groupings" of African states, and, eventually and ideally, an "African Commonwealth."
One point, at least, is clear. A few years ago Pan-Africanism in this sense might have been dismissed as a utopia, the pipe-dream of a few African intellectuals in Bloomsbury or the Quartier Latin. Now, unquestionably, it has transferred itself into an ideology, an operative system of ideas. It has begun to express itself through actual institutions, even though they may be still only embryonic in process of formation: the Conference of Independent African States, the All-African People's Conference, the Ghana-Guinea Union, the Saniquellie Declaration of Principles, etc. And it is essentially the ideology of some of the major radical mass parties which are at the same time some of the best organized -c.P.P. in Ghana, P.D.G. in Guinea, Union Soudanais in Mali. As these parties, or at least their leaders and militants, see the situation, the African revolution must necessarily involve two states. The fIrst takes the form of the winning of formal political independence. This stage has already been reached in most of West Africa. The next involves the creation of larger political systems-and, in this region, a United States of West Africa-as a pre-condition of real independence and social progress of Africans making an adequate contribution to humanity.
Are they justifIed in their view? Does this Pan-African movement possess, or can it develop, the kind of compelling ideas, the range of appeal, the effectiveness of organization and leadership, the favourable external situation, which have played a part in other revolutionary movements, from the Prophet Muhammad to Mao Tse-Tung, and which have given a new direction to human history? I don't know. There have been setbacks, as, for instance, in Mali. But since many Western observers entirely misjudged the extremely rapid tempo of this fIrst phase of national revolution, prophesying another two hundred years, or even a millennium, of quiet colonial rule in Africa, we would do well to show a certain modesty in any judgments we may make about the prospects for this second, "Pan-African," phase.
